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This paper aims at interrogating the nature of political suppression and the extent to which civil liberties were 
violated in the erstwhile Ciskei and Transkei. Whatever the South African government's reasons, publicly stated or 
hidden, for encouraging bantustan independence, by the time of Ciskei's independence ceremonies in December 
1981 it was clear that the bantustans were also to be used as a more brutal instrument for suppressing opposition. 
Both Transkei and Ciskei used additional emergency-style laws to silence opposition in the run-up to both self-
government and later independence. By the mid-1980s a clear pattern of brutal suppression of opposition had 
emerged in both bantustans, with South Africa frequently washing its hands of the situation on the grounds that 
these were 'independent' countries. Both bantustans borrowed repressive South African legislation initially and, in 
addition, backed this up with emergency-style regulations passed with South African assistance before 
independence (Proclamation 400 and 413 in Transkei which operated from 1960 until 1977, and Proclamation 
R252 in Ciskei which operated from 1977 until 1982). The emergency Proclamations 400, 413 and R252 appear to 
have been retained in the Transkei case and introduced in the Ciskei in order to suppress legal opposition at the 
time of attainment of self-government status. Police in the bantustans (initially SAP and later the Transkei and 
Ciskei Police) targeted political opponents rather than criminals, as the SAP did in South Africa. 
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Introduction
This paper intends to demonstrate how bantustan legislation appeared to be more repressive than parallel legislation 
used in South Africa. This law enabled among others detentions, bannings of individuals and organisations, and limits on 
the right to strike. Most of the powers were exercised on the discretion of the commander-general of national security, 
Charles Sebe (Adam and Moodley 1993: 56-68). This paper will also delve into questions of whether the bantustan police 
acted with extraordinary brutality. For example, the Pondoland Revolt of 1960 and events in subsequent years elicited a 
venomous backlash from the police (still the SAP in the early years), with police assaulting detainees so badly that it 
appears they cared little whether detainees lived or died (Bergh and Visagie 1985: 112-121). The Human Rights 
Commission (HRC) recorded thirty-two deaths in detention between 1976 and 1982. The Eastern Cape accounted for 
eight of these (25 per cent), with five of the eight in the two bantustans (four in Transkei, one in Ciskei and three in Port 
Elizabeth) (Dugard 1980: 22-28).
It will be established if the bantustan authorities did have open links with vigilante groups and to what extent. The 
Ciskei government went so far as to make facilities available to the vigilantes: the use of the Mdantsane stadium as a base 
for the Green Berets in 1983, the use of a training camp for the Zwelitsha vigilantes in 1985 along with an MP to work 
with them, and the use of a military base and a private security company as trainers in the 1990s (Human Rights Watch/
Africa 1994: 38-44). These vigilantes were, in all cases, used to target unionists and commuters in 1983, members of 
progressive youth structures in 1985 and ANC members in 1990 (Johns and [?] 1991: 46). Under the military 
dictatorships, this trend was even more obvious as they ruled by decrees, some of which appear to have been issued on 
whims (Manganyi 1990: 64-73). While the police tended to operate in overt and brutal ways (detentions, torture, and 
assassinations), by the mid-1980s the South African military was learning how to manipulate the separate Ciskei and 
Transkei security forces and ultimately the politicians in the region. Such military activities became even more 
sophisticated in the 1990s when the need for a clandestine method of destabilising the now-legal ANC arose. The 
independent bantustans provided a perfect loophole for this. 
The Pondoland Revolt
What became known as the ‘Pondoland Revolt’ took place in Pondoland in eastern Transkei in the late 1950s and early 
1960s (Manganyi 1990: 91). This was an extended uprising by Pondoland groups – particularly ANC supporters who 
referred to themselves as iKongo members – against the imposition of tribal authorities and impending self-government 
for Transkei (Karis and Carter 1972-1977: 52). Numerous incidents of violence took place during 1960, including clashes 
between security forces and iKongo members, attacks by iKongo members on chiefs and those regarded as collaborating 
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with chiefs or police, and the destruction of iKongo members’ homes by chiefs. Legal methods used by the security forces 
to crush this revolt included the declaration of a state of emergency on 30 November 1960, widespread detentions, 
criminal prosecutions and banishment of families. Illegal methods included torture in custody (primarily in detention), 
deaths in custody, apparently due to treatment received, and the use of unnecessary force in public order policing. The 
over 200 statements received by the Commission in connection with this matter indicated that torture, killings and 
disappearances were a key feature of security force responses to this revolt (Lodge1983: 75).
On 6 June 1960, conflict developed between security forces and iKongo members at Ngquza Hill in the Lusikisiki 
region of Pondoland, when security forces broke up an iKongo meeting. Most accounts indicate that the meeting was 
teargassed from aircraft, after which police on the ground moved in, some of them opening fire, killing at least eleven 
iKongo members. An inquest subsequently found that at least some of the dead had been killed by fire from Sten guns 
(Gerhart 1978: 35). It also became known that security force members had parachuted from the aircraft. It seems clear 
that the SAP were involved in this incident, although the extent of their involvement is not. The SANDF told the 
Commission that: "In the sequence of events it is clear that the SADF was over the said period definitely not deployed in 
the Transkei" (Manganyi 1990: 64-73). However, the aircraft used in the operation must have been SADF aircraft used in 
support of police operations (the SAP had no aircraft at that time) and, if there were any parachutists, these were 
probably SADF members. The SAPS said they had no knowledge of the use by police of Sten guns in 1960. According to 
the SANDF, both police and military were armed with Sten guns (Biko 1972: 4).
Sten submachine guns were only issued to the platoon leaders (lieutenants) and platoon sergeants of which, according 
to the strength of the SADF elements, there were about eight in total. The troops were issued with .303 rifles. From 
memory, it seems that the SAP was issued with 9mm Sten submachine guns. It seems probable that the shooting was 
carried out by the police as, if the SADF were involved in this incident, they were probably involved as backup to an SAP 
operation as was standard procedure. The SAPS said it had no records from this period, but said both military and police 
were involved:
Information received is that the police and soldiers were operating jointly to arrest the Pondo people. 
Information further indicates that soldiers were not interested to go for negotiations; as a result people were 
shot dead (Manganyi 1990: 64-73).
The SADF had been used in the Transkei before the Nqquza Hill incident, during Operation Duiker from 21 March 1960 
to 7 May 1960, when six platoons and four Saracen troop carriers were sent to Transkei. All troops had left the region by 
7 May and did not return until late November, when Operation Otter started in Durban (which involved air support to 
the SAP), followed by Operation Swivel from 7 December 1960, which continued at least until early January 1961. A 
report from the colonel in charge of Swivel to the then chief of army staff indicated that, from 16 to 30 November 1960, 
the SADF were involved in six operations that resulted in the detention of 1 330 people in the Pondoland district. At the 
same time, two mobile watches of 300 troops were sent to Bizana in terms of Operation Swivel (Ottaway 1993: 119).
While the SADF was present in support of the police during at least part of this period, it is clear that it was the police 
who had primary responsibility for dealing with the revolt. The main tool appears to have been mass detentions. From 27 
January 1961 about 4 769 people had been detained, with 2 067 eventually brought to trial (Price 1991:44). Statements 
made to the Commission indicate that torture was a key part of those detentions. This was supported both by the 
submissions handed to the Commission by Kairos and by literature on the Pondoland Revolt. Mkambati forest was 
frequently named as a site of torture. This appears to have been a camp with tents in the forest during the 1960s, possibly 
set up during the Pondoland Revolt as a police crisis measure, later becoming an established police station. While the 
SAPS was unable to provide any information on the setting up of the Mkambati police station, it is understood that during 
the 1960s this station was under the command of Colonel Theunis Jacobus 'Rooi Rus' Swanepoel. Kairos refers to 
Swanepoel as a notorious police officer who played a key role in the 1960s and later became the chief interrogator of the 
SAP's Security Branch (Price 1991:44).
Sparks states that, immediately after the Ngquza shootings, police rounded up suspects and family members were also 
assaulted by police in attempts to track suspects. Suspects were detained, assaulted, tortured and released still suffering 
the after-effects of either torture or illness (possibly tuberculosis) contracted in detention or jail. He further states that 
some subsequently died; the health of others appears to have been permanently damaged (Sparks 1990: 89). In most 
cases police assaulted detainees to the point of permanent injury and then released them to die at home. Others returned 
home mentally disturbed. These cases point towards a deliberate policy of assaulting detainees, who could have been 
used as experimental cases by the SAP.  Needless to say, detainees who died or who suffered permanent injury may have 
been subjected to one or more severe assaults, untreated exposure to illnesses such as tuberculosis, electric shocks 
(including shocks to the head), and poisoning (Karis and Carter 1972-1977: 64). 
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The use of vigilantes in Ciskei
The period 1983-1989 saw the rise of organised vigilantes supported by the bantustan authorities in Ciskei; the 
beginnings of SADF MI manipulation of the bantustans to foster inter-bantustan conflict through Operation Katzen in 
what may have been part of a national bantustans military strategy; the implementation of a South African security force 
policy of killing rather than capturing guerrillas; an increase in the use of torture in bantustans, and the first internally-
initiated bantustan military coups, which led to ongoing and increasingly vicious battles between the bantustan and 
Pretoria security forces. During 1985, there was a national wave of vigilante groups starting to operate. These were 
generally groups which targeted UDF members and their allies.
Over the years, vigilantes were used on several occasions by the Ciskei authorities. Moleah (1993: 43) records the 
first use of vigilantes in Ciskei as being during 1974, when vigilantes known as the "Green Berets", who were members of 
the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP), assaulted Mdantsane commuters during a boycott of the local bus 
company. In 1977 vigilantes again emerged, this time to target Mdantsane schoolchildren who were boycotting classes in 
protests over Mr. Steve Biko's death in detention (Horrell 1978: 42). While there was suspicion that these vigilantes were 
linked to the bantustan authorities and they appeared to act in support of the bantustan government, there was no clear 
evidence of state support for them.
However, there was clear Ciskei government support for the vigilantes that operated during the July 1983 boycott of 
Ciskei Transport Corporation (CTC) buses in Mdantsane. The boycott started on 19 July; on 2 August, vigilantes 
operating under the supervision of police were brought in to run roadblocks; they were involved in assaulting commuters 
(Horrell 1978: 42). Police, army and vigilantes were used to break the boycott by assaulting commuters who used taxis, 
trains and private cars, and taxi drivers. The vigilantes were also given the use of the central Sisa Dukashe stadium in 
Mdantsane as a venue for holding detainees. Moleah (1993: 61) reports that there was "overwhelming evidence" that the 
vigilantes were involved in the assault and torture of detainees at the stadium. Ciskei Minister of Justice, David Takane, 
denied knowledge of this, but did acknowledge that the vigilantes were operating with official endorsement. On 26 
August 1983, the Ciskei Supreme Court granted two urgent applications restraining the security forces and vigilantes 
from harassing Mdantsane residents. The Ciskei authorities did not oppose the order.
At least some of these vigilantes are believed to have been recruited from government supporters in the rural regions: 
here the involvement of chiefs was crucial. This was another element in the increasing conflict between chiefs and their 
communities. By 1983, Moleah (1993) records that the tension between chiefs, headmen and the communities in Ciskei 
was so great that Lennox Sebe had authorised them to carry guns (Lave 1994: 483-524).
Along with the national emergence of vigilantes in 1985, vigilantes with links to the Ciskei authorities re-emerged. This 
time the group operated in Zwelitsha and targeted those linked to progressive structures. In September, vigilantes in 
Zwelitsha hunted down South African Students' Organisation (SASO) activist Zandisile Matyolo with the assistance of 
Ciskei security forces. Days earlier Ciskei police had threatened Mr. Matyolo's mother that he would be killed. He was 
chased and killed in front of witnesses (Lave 1994: 483-524). This was an extreme case and the vigilantes were 
subsequently prosecuted. One of those convicted was Mr. Willie Kolisile Matsheketwa, who applied for amnesty for this 
killing. He had been sentenced to eight years imprisonment, reduced on appeal to eleven months. Matsheketwa, at the 
time a Ciskei MP, joined the Green Beret vigilante group in 1976.
While a member of the Green Berets, I used to accommodate other members who had no homes locally as 
some were pulled in from neighbouring localities. Some incidents of violence occurred and I was implicated 
as I was housing the Green Berets. This was mostly in 1976  (Lave 1994: 483-524).
He said that by 1985 he was a CNIP MP and was not involved in Green Beret activities; however, he re-joined after Ciskei 
president Lennox Sebe ordered men to join the group to oppose youths who wanted to burn down schools. "Those who 
defied this order were harassed," (Lave 1994: 483-524) said Matsheketwa. He said on one occasion he had been sent by 
another MP to tell a police colonel that a contingent of guards was on their way to come and assist the police to guard 
schools. Further incidents of violence recurred between the guards and youths who wanted to burn down schools. These 
guards were subsequently called Inkatha. In July 1987, vigilantes killed activist Zola Nozewu who had been involved in 
resistance to Ciskei rule by the Potsdam community. It is not clear how closely these vigilantes were linked to the state; 
however, like Matyolo, Mr Nozewu was killed after police warned his family he would die if he did not leave politics alone 
(Horrell 1978: 54)
When military ruler Brigadier Oupa Gqozo deposed Sebe’s government, the use of state-sponsored vigilantes 
continued. When the clashes between Gqozo's government and ANC supporters became increasingly bloody during 
1992-94, Gqozo hired a private security company – Peace Force – to guard government installations and to recruit and 
train members of the government’s African Democratic Movement (ADM), which acted as a vigilante force. As with the 
1983 vigilantes, rural chiefs and headmen were crucial in recruiting these trainees. (SAIRR 1994: 94). This group was given 
24  
Inkanyiso, Jnl Hum & Soc Sci 2016, 8(1)
training by Peace Force at the CDF military base on the coast, next door to Gqozo’s private farm, and was armed with 
shotguns. Later Gqozo’s security forces also armed headmen with G3 rifles. Needless to say, this demonstrated 
unprecedented levels of suppressing opposition and violating civil liberties.
Ciskei policy to subdue dissent
On several occasions during the 1980s, Ciskei targeted entire communities opposed to bantustan rule – often 
communities that had been subjected to forced removals or incorporation into the bantustan (Worden 1995: 80). In the 
mid-1980s, the Kuni community was evicted from Ciskei en masse and dumped at the roadside in South Africa, where 
they later found a home at Needs Camp outside East London.
In 1987, a large group of residents fled at least twice from Potsdam outside Mdantsane following assaults by police and 
vigilantes. South African security forces forcibly loaded the group onto trucks and drove them back to Potsdam. In April 
1989, they were granted permanent residence at Eluxolweni in South Africa. This group had some years earlier been 
forcibly removed across the border into Ciskei. In August 1988, the Ciskei borders were redrawn to incorporate the 
Nkqonqkweni village at Peelton near King William’s Town (Swartz, Leslie, and Levitt 1990: 265-86). In drawing the Ciskei 
boundaries in 1981, the village had inadvertently been split in two. The redrawing of the border was to enable the South 
African government to banish UDF activist Steve Tshwete to his home village of Nqonqkweni in Ciskei rather than 
Nqonqkweni in South Africa. In the following year, Nqonqkweni residents complained of repeated assaults by Ciskei 
forces.
This eventually resulted in a mass exodus of residents to King William’s Town. Ciskei declared a state of emergency in 
the Peelton area and violence and bulldozing of rebels’ houses followed. In a court case arising out of the conflict, the 
Ciskei Supreme Court found against Mr. James Fikile Phindani, a resident of Peelton village, who had been evicted from 
his home and dumped across the South African border by the Ciskei security police in 1989, and approved the passing of 
a retrospective law which allowed the Ciskei authorities to do this. Eventually the incorporation issue was quietly 
dropped and residents returned home (Swartz, Leslie, and Levitt 1990: 265-86).
The Peelton conflict was the beginning of widespread rural rebellion against Ciskei president Chief Lennox Sebe’s 
rule, which resulted in initial popular support for Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, who overthrew Sebe’s government in March 
1990. A press report from 1989 commenting on the battles by various communities to escape Ciskei rule said:
It’s not hard to find the reasons why the communities are so desperate to leave. On the one hand, there is 
widespread objection to the whole notion of an 'independent' Ciskei. On the other, there are massive 
practical problems associated with the bantustans … [T]he territory's social benefits and facilities are 
generally inferior to those of South Africa. For example, old age pensions are substantially lower than in South 
Africa  (Price 1991:66).
Ciskei also demands several different types of taxes – ranging from 'development tax' to membership of the 
ruling Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP). Those without the notorious 'CNIP card' may often find 
themselves barred from benefits and even housing.
Far worse are the extremely common allegations of assaults and routine harassment – particularly of resisting 
communities – by Ciskei authorities. Often the Ciskei police and army are accused of acting together with 
vigilante groupings. CNIP membership also seems to be used by Ciskei as a measure of loyalty to the 
territory (Moodie 1975: 73. There are repeated stories of communities brutalised by Ciskei authorities for 
refusing to pay taxes and CNIP membership. Pensioners complained of their pensions being docked. 
Refugees from the Potsdam grouping, who three times fled Ciskei, claimed they were refused treatment at 
clinics, their children turned away from school. Community leaders were murdered (Price 1991:72). It could 
thus be concluded that the suppression of political opponents was brutal and merciless to the extreme.
Destabilisation through Operation Katzen
In January 1983, Brigadier Christoffel Pierre 'Joffel' van der Westhuizen moved to Port Elizabeth to take over as officer 
responsible for the SADF's Eastern Province Command. In attendance at his taking-over ceremony were Ciskei security 
chief General Charles Sebe and Major General Ron Reid-Daly of the TDF (Moodie 1975: 77). Over the next few years, 
these three men were to work together on Van der Westhuizen's ambitious Operation Katzen plan, drafted in an attempt 
to retain SADF control over both the Transkei and Ciskei and to use the bantustans as a bulwark against the rising tide of 
popular resistance.
Charles Sebe had a meteoric rise to power in Ciskei. He joined the SAP in 1957 at the age of twenty-three and was 
transferred six years later to the security police. He was based in Port Elizabeth for some time. In 1974, he joined the 
Bureau for State Security (BOSS) and worked in King William's Town where he was involved in investigating the Black 
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Consciousness Movement. In October 1978, he was transferred to the new Ciskei administration where he founded the 
Ciskei Central Intelligence Service with only three men (Manganyi and du Toit 1990: 270-82). By 1979, he was a colonel 
and the Ciskei police were under his control. By the end of 1981, he was a major-general and in September 1982 
(following Ciskei independence and the passing of the National Security Act of 1982) he was promoted to lieutenant 
general and then to a new position of commander general in control of all the armed forces in Ciskei, a total of about 4 
500 men. As commander general, he was paid about R3 500 per month.
As an SAP member, Sebe said he "carried my promotions in my pocket" (as he told journalist Joseph Lelyveld). Two 
years after the ANC was banned, Sebe, then an SAP member, joined the ANC and later helped arrest both ANC leader 
Govan Mbeki and members of the fledgling Poqo (Manganyi and du Toit 1990: 270-82). Sebe also appears to have been 
close to South African commissioner of police General Johan Coetzee: according to Lelyveld, while Sebe was in charge in 
Ciskei, he apparently reported directly to Coetzee and was also subject to overrule by officers seconded from South 
Africa. Court papers in Sebe's 1983-84 trial indicated that he had telephoned Coetzee, apparently in search of advice, the 
night before his arrest.
In July 1983, Sebe made one of his last public appearances as Van der Westhuizen's guest (this time at the SADF's 
seventy-first birthday celebrations). By the middle of July, Sebe had lost his total control of the security forces due to a re-
shuffle in those forces on the president’s orders, and his deputy was in detention (Worden 1995: 89). Within days, Sebe 
himself was detained and in June 1984 was convicted of incitement to violence, after an attempt to get his deputy 
released from custody. He was jailed for twelve years and leave to appeal was refused. Lennox Sebe subsequently turned 
down three separate appeals by South African foreign affairs minister Pik Botha to show clemency towards Charles Sebe.
In January 1985, the SADF was evicted from Ciskei following the deaths of recruits at a Ciskei base, and South Africa 
lost its foothold in that bantustan. By 1986, Van der Westhuizen had drafted the Katzen plans for an operation that 
involved a successful jailbreak, abductions and an abortive attempt to abduct or kill Lennox Sebe, in which at least two 
TDF members died (Worden 1995: 90). On 2 June 1986, Chief Lent Maqoma, a one-time ally of Lennox Sebe, launched 
his Ciskei People’s Rights Protection Party; this was followed a few months later by the launch by the rebel group in 
Transkei of the ‘armed wing’ of this party, Iliso Lomzi. It seems that both were launched with MI assistance. MI 
subsequently printed and distributed pamphlets (including dropping them from aircraft) in support of these two groupings 
(Moodie 1975: 83).
In September 1986, Charles Sebe was sprung from the Ciskei’s Middledrift maximum security prison by SADF 
members and/or ex-Selous Scouts operating from Transkei; from then on he operated from Transkei together with the 
rest of the Katzen group. The day Charles was released, Lennox Sebe's son Kwane Sebe, the head of the Ciskei Police 
Elite Unit and the man groomed as the successor to the president, was abducted and taken to Transkei (Moleah 1993: 
70). Three months later, Kwane was sent back to Ciskei in a bantustan prisoner swap. 
Attempts to extradite Charles Sebe back to Ciskei collapsed. The then Ciskei Attorney-General Jurie Jurgens applied 
for their extradition, subsequently finding that both these matters had quietly fizzled out in some political settlement 
(Moleah 1993: 72). This presumably involved some pressure from the South African authorities, which had previously 
campaigned for Charles Sebe’s pardon. In January 1987, Van der Westhuizen left the Eastern Cape and took over as 
officer commanding the Witwatersrand Command. On 21 January, Holomisa, then second-in-command of the TDF, was 
detained; partly, it seems, because he opposed the Katzen planners. Weeks later, on 19 February, TDF troops crossed the 
Kei River border between Transkei and South Africa, and drove on to launch an abortive attack on Ciskei president 
Lennox Sebe’s private palace in Bisho (Manganyi 1990: 69-76). It was reported that one TDF soldier died and another 
was captured; later South African authorities captured French mercenary Jean-Michel Desble.
The captured soldier, Rifleman A Ndulu, was held under guard in the Ciskei's main Cecilia Makiwane Hospital in 
Mdantsane, then eventually sent home to Ciskei in terms of a deal apparently engineered by Holomisa. Likewise, the 
body of the soldier, Mr. Mbuyiselo Templeton Nondela, was allowed home for burial. The Commission found evidence of 
another previously unreported death and direct SADF complicity in the raid. (Karis and Carter 1977: 64). A TDF soldier 
who was badly injured in the failed attack, Mr. David Simphiwe Makazi, was rushed down to East London by his fellow 
attackers. He was airlifted by the SADF from the East London race track and flown back to Butterworth. Apart from Van 
der Westhuizen and the officer he reported to on Katzen, General Kat Liebenberg, other senior officers and officials 
named in the Katzen file as having been involved at some stage included General Jannie Geldenhuys (head of SADF Special 
Forces), General Griebenauw (Border regional head of the security police), General Zondwa Mtirara (head of the TDF), 
Vice-Admiral Dries Putter, Colonel Reg Deyzel (the officer commanding of Group Eight in East London), a former 
Transkei minister of defence and Dr. Tertius Delport (then at the University of Port Elizabeth). Delport later denied any 
knowledge of the Katzen plans (Johns and Davis 1991: 132). In 1983-84, Delport had served as one of two assessors at 
the Ciskei trial after which Charles Sebe was jailed for twelve years.
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The National Intelligence Service (NIS) also appears to have been involved in Katzen. One of the NIS staff was 
involved in at least some of the planning. An undated document headed "Top Secret", which appears to be the 
abbreviated notes of a meeting, lists those present as including an SADF general, an SADF brigadier, an SAP brigadier, 
three colonels, two commandants and an NIS representative. Another document refers to NIS involvement: "All political 
front actions (Lent Maqoma) will now be handled by NIS. We will continue to co-operate politically/militarily" (Johns and 
Davis 1991: 132). A "Top Secret" NIS document on Katzen, which appears to have been drafted during rather than after 
the operation, lists those involved in or aware of Katzen as including President PW Botha, SADF chief General Jannie 
Geldenhuys, army chief General Kat Liebenberg, the commissioner of police (then General Johan Coetzee), the 
secretariat of the State Security Council and the director general of NIS (Moleah 1993: 75).
The collapse of the Katzen Plan
On 1 April 1987 the Ciskei banned both the Ciskei People’s Rights Protection Party and Iliso Lomzi (Manganyi 1990: 64-
77). On 4 April, Transkei detained sixteen white military officers, mainly the ex-Selous Scouts. Soon after their departure, 
Holomisa took charge of the TDF, and Transkei support for Katzen was severely curtailed. Desble made a few token 
appearances in the East London courts before being officially deported back to France. In an interview in 1995, Attorney-
General Jurgens said that his flight made an unscheduled stop before reaching France so that he could disembark and thus 
avoid prosecution as a mercenary in France.
A month or two later, former General Johan Coetzee, now retired as SAP commissioner, was appointed to run a tri-
partite committee out of East London to keep the peace between the warring bantustans (Johns and Davis 1991: 134). 
The TDF convened a board of enquiry into the abortive attack on Ciskei in August 1987. Its work was concluded and 
handed to the Transkei minister of defence. The SANDF was unable to trace this report.
In 1989, the Harms Commission of Inquiry into the Jalc group of companies heard that Putter, who was the chief of MI 
at the time and party to the Katzen plan, had been warned about the impending attack by one of his staff. MI officer 
Brigadier Marthinus Deyzel, seconded to Jalc in terms of a proposal for MI to use Jalc for intelligence-gathering purposes 
in the bantustans and frontline states, told Harms that Lennox Sebe had told him he was aware of an impending attack on 
him by elements of the SADF (Price 1991:73). Deyzel, who seems to have been unaware of the Katzen plan, told his 
superiors. He subsequently complained to the Harms inquiry that his warning had been ignored. Putter told Harms he 
had taken Deyzel's warning extremely seriously and that he had written a memo for circulation among his superiors. The 
memo, dated 9 February 1987, stated (Lave 1994: 483-524):
The Ciskei Government alleges that they have information that several RSA elements are involved in the 
destabilisation of the Ciskei. If this is correct, it would be advisable to put a stop to it … An investigation of 
the facts must be urgently undertaken and certain punishment procedures will have to be considered. At the 
same time that Katzen was running in the Eastern Cape, the SADF’s Operation Marion was running in 
KwaZulu. The attack on Ciskei was carried out on 19 February; the KwaMakhutha attack carried out in terms 
of Marion, which killed thirteen people, was carried out just weeks earlier in January.
There are several links between Marion and Katzen. Both operations were co-ordinated at Defence Headquarters in 
Pretoria by Colonel John More, at the time part of the DST. More was mentioned in the Katzen documents as supplying 
weapons for that operation. Liebenberg and Geldenhuys, two of the accused in the KwaMakhutha trial, were also named 
in Katzen documentation. Lieutenant Colonel Jan Anton Nieuwoudt, who was involved in the 1986 Caprivi strip training 
of the men who carried out the KwaMakhutha attack, was subsequently (in the run-up to the 1994 elections) involved in 
an Eastern Cape operation which seems to have been a successor to Katzen (Breytenbach 1991: 83-91). Liebenberg was 
involved in 'officially' shutting that operation down after it was blown and Nieuwoudt moved and apparently continued 
the operation in a different form elsewhere. General Tienie Groenewald was another of the KwaMakhutha accused; 
during the 1990s he was involved in an organisation that was implicated in running guns to prop up Gqozo's government 
in its battle against the ANC.
As More was part of DST, this indicates that both Marion and Katzen were run by DST, a section also responsible for 
running covert support to pro-Pretoria rebels in Angola (UNITA) and Mozambique (RENAMO) (Lave 1994: 483-524). 
This indicates that the bantustans were also part of MI's strategy of supporting (and sometimes setting up) rebel groups 
that were involved in violent attempts to overthrow governments which were either antagonistic to or could not be 
controlled by Pretoria, or were involved in violent clashes with UDF-aligned (and later ANC-aligned) groupings. In the 
bantustans, this thus involved covert support for Inkatha in the KwaZulu-Natal region and, in the Eastern Cape, the 
setting up and funding of first the Ciskei People’s Rights Protection Party and Iliso Lomzi and later the setting up and 
arming of the ADM (Breytenbach 1991: 83-94) . This policy does not appear to have ended with the failure of Marion and 
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Katzen in 1987 as several of the key officers involved in those two operations were again implicated in similar activities 
based in the Ciskei during Gqozo's rule and the run-up to the 1994 elections.
Although Katzen seems to have collapsed in early 1987, its legacy of violating civil liberties continued. Two years later, 
Lennox Sebe’s Ciskei government still regarded Iliso Lomzi as a threat, as can been seen in a "Top Secret" CDF 
contingency plan for dealing with an attack expected by "elements of Iliso Lomzi supported by the TDF and ex-
Rhodesians" around 24-25 July 1989 (SACS 1995: 39-47).
Security force and the guerrillas
Former SADF Special Forces commander General Joep Joubert told the Commission that, in the mid-1980s, he drew up 
a plan for the elimination and destruction of ANC activists, their allies and supporting structures. The then SADF chief 
General Jannie Geldenhuys had instructed him to draw up a plan to enable Special Forces to assist the SAP in countering 
the revolutionary onslaught. The proposal called for the use of both clandestine and counter-revolutionary methods 
against the liberation movements. "I did discuss the plan with General Geldenhuys (Hill and Harris 1989: 68). I was under 
the impression that it was approved. Operations were then launched in line with the plan," Joubert told the Commission's 
armed forces hearing. The Eastern Cape, along with Northern Transvaal and the Witwatersrand, were identified as the 
problem areas. Joubert’s plan called for co-operation between Special Forces, the regional SADF commands and the 
regional heads of the security police. Joubert could not say when these operations ended; he said no order had been 
given to cease operations.
Apart from SADF raids on the front-line states during the 1980s, this plan appears to have involved the setting up of 
the 1986-87 Operations Katzen and Marion (see above): documentation in the Katzen file indicates that both Joubert and 
Geldenhuys were involved in Katzen, while Geldenhuys was one of the accused in the KwaMakhutha trial arising from 
Marion (SACS 1995: 39-47). The Border region head of security police, General Griebenauw, was also involved in the 
Katzen plan.
Joubert’s plan also clearly involved assistance with the targeting of individual guerrillas who were then tracked down 
by police acting in conjunction with askaris, and assassinated. Police statistics for the time indicate that insurgency 
increased dramatically in 1985, from fifty-one incidents reported in 1981, thirty-nine in 1982, fifty-five in 1983 and forty-
four in 1984 to a massive 136 incidents for 1985.
It is interesting to note that, according to information handed to the Commission by the ANC, 60 per cent of the 246 
MK members who died in combat were killed during the four years from 1986 to 1989, the period when the Joubert plan 
was probably in operation. According to the ANC list, at least 17 per cent of the deaths during those four years were 
either in the Eastern Cape or were of guerrillas who had been operating in the Eastern Cape (Tutu 1994: 54). In the 
Eastern Cape the Joubert plan would have focused on guerrilla infiltration from Lesotho via Transkei and would thus have 
involved:
It is also likely that General Johan Coetzee, the recently retired commissioner of police, was involved. Coetzee was 
brought into the region and based in East London from about March 1987 until April 1989; his official brief was to run a 
tri-partite commission aimed at keeping the peace between Ciskei and Transkei, but this commission never operated and 
it seems his real reason for being there was to help run the clandestine security operations.
It is during this period that the security police set up an additional base in the Eastern Cape in support of Vlakplaas – 
based on a farm outside East London and apparently set up sometime during 1987 (Roux 1964: 120). It is highly likely that 
one of Coetzee’s key tasks was to oversee the setting up of this base.
During the mid-1980s in Transkei, there was a marked increase in the number of incidents involving both sabotage by 
guerrillas and armed clashes between guerrillas and police. By 1988, a spate of security trials was underway or had 
recently been concluded. Most of these related to ANC activity and many were linked to each other, indicating the 
operation of a widespread guerrilla network across Transkei. The security force actions against this network indicate that 
Joubert’s plan was indeed implemented in this region (Roux 1964: 120). The years 1987 and 1988 were particularly bad 
for guerrillas operating in Transkei, featuring several hit squad killings.
The fuel depot bombing suspects
On 25 June 1985, the Umtata fuel depot was blown up, together with the city’s water pipelines and electricity sub-
station. In what must surely have been one of the most spectacularly successful MK operations, the fuel depot burned all 
day, leaving panicked Umtata residents queuing for petrol, the city without electricity for several days, and the possibility 
of running out of water before the pipelines and electrical pumps could be restored.
On 24 September, student activist Bathandwa Ndondo, a University of Transkei student representative council 
member who had been expelled the year before, was picked up at his home in Cala near the South African border by a 
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unit involving SAP member Mbuso Enoch Shabalala, Transkei policeman Sergeant Gciniso Lamont Dandala and askaris 
Silulami Gladstone Mose and Xolelwa Virginia Shosha (SAIRR 1993: 93). He was shot dead. Within weeks, the then Tran-
skei president Chief Kaiser Matanzima had announced publicly that Ndondo had been killed because he had been in-
volved in the fuel depot bombings.
Guerrillas Masizizi Attwell "Pieces" Maqekeza, Zola Dubeni, Welile Salman, Sisa Ngombeni and Mzwandile Vena were 
sought by police in connection with the fuel depot bombing. On 21-2 January 1987, Maqekeza was one of two guerrillas 
who assisted guerrilla Mbulelo Ngono, aka "Khaya Kasibe" or "KK", to escape after a thirty-six-hour shoot-out between 
Ngono and the combined forces of the TPF, TDF and SAP.  Maqekeza and Ngono, together with Mr. Thandwefika 
Radebe, were attacked by unknown gunmen in Lesotho weeks later (SAIRR 1995: 53). Radebe was killed, Ngono fled and 
subsequently disappeared, while Maqekeza was killed by unknown gunmen on 15 March 1987 while recovering under 
police guard in the Maseru hospital from the first attack. 
During 1988, Maqekeza was mentioned in at least five security trials in Transkei in cases in which others were charged 
with assisting him. Also in March 1987, Dubeni was shot dead by police in Cape Town, allegedly after trying to attack 
them after pointing out his arms cache (USIP 1993: 24). Ngono disappeared later in 1988 when he was abducted by 
South African security police from Lesotho to work as an askari; he has never returned home and his fate is unknown (the 
Commission received amnesty applications in connection with this abduction). 
In October 1990, Salman died in Mafikeng in a shoot-out with security force members. Vena, one of the only guerrillas 
linked by police to the fuel depot bombing to survive, was arrested in Cape Town in 1988; he subsequently unsuccessfully 
fought against his extradition to Transkei where he was later released after the 1990 unbannings. Those who had offered 
assistance to guerrillas such as Maqekeza, Dubeni and Vena were subsequently arrested and tortured. They included Mr. 
Zakade Alfred Buka and Mr. Dugard Maqekeza (USIP 1993: 26).
About twenty eventually ended up in court in various cases. The main case was thrown out of court after months of 
postponements; police scrambled to re-capture some of their detainees as they leapt over the dock and ran for the 
courtroom doors as soon as the magistrate made the ruling. Few of the guerrillas made it as far as a courtroom; Vena 
seems to be a notable exception here. Generally those who got to court were those who were charged with assisting 
guerrillas (SACS 1994: 34-41). Key Eastern Cape people were also targeted by other regional police forces during this 
period. For example, on 25 April 1987 Mr Phindile Mfeti (40) disappeared in Durban. The Commission subsequently 
found that Mfeti, a unionist who had been banished to Transkei, had been abducted, murdered and secretly buried by the 
Natal SAP.
In August 1987, police tried to kill guerrilla Stembele Zokwe outside Umtata; he survived and managed to get to 
hospital. A second attack followed, but apparently the presence of witnesses frightened off the attackers (Juckes 1995: 
110). On 12 January 1988, Zokwe's luck ran out and he was shot dead by police hours after being arrested in 
Butterworth. Rumours at the time were that he was an askari who had outlived his usefulness or changed his mind about 
assisting the police: ANC sources at the time questioned how Zokwe had managed to avoid being charged and was 
instead freed after he had been arrested in Bophuthatswana on his return to the country with another guerrilla, Mr. 
Gilbert Binda, who was jailed for seven years (Juckes 1995: 112). Two Transkei police officers, Sergeant Mtobeli Tyani and 
Sergeant Pumelele Gumengu, were charged with his murder, but both escaped from different jails on the same day and 
disappeared.
The failed abduction
The suppression of political opposition and the violation of civil liberties also manifested itself through abductions. In 
December 1987 advocate Joseph Mzwakhe Miso was snatched from the streets of Umtata, having been mistaken for 
lawyer Dumisa Ntsebeza, and driven out of town towards the Kei Bridge border with South Africa by white men who 
claimed to be South African policemen. They beat him badly and threatened to kill him, releasing him only after he was 
able to prove his identity. Only days before this attack, Ntsebeza had been in Queenstown for a case and had been 
threatened by Major Venter of the Queenstown security police in the presence of Border region security chief Brigadier 
Griebenauw. Ntsebeza's brother (HRW/A 1994: 75), Ndondo, had been killed two years earlier by a hit squad and 
Ntsebeza's attempts to get a prosecution underway had repeatedly been thwarted by the authorities.
The Vlakplaas askaris were clearly operating in the Eastern Cape and in the then independent Transkei during the early 
1980s. The Terrorism Research Centre incident lists record that on 7 August 1981 there was shoot-out between the 
police and the ANC cadres in Butterworth following a bomb blast in East London the day before; two Transkei policemen 
died. Later the same day two SAP members were seriously injured in a clash with the same guerrillas at a roadblock near 
Elliot on the main road to Lesotho; "Two ANC gunmen killed, one captured," noted the Terrorism Research Centre. Five 
days later the organisation recorded "Two ANC gunmen fatally wounded, one policeman seriously wounded, in shootout 
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with police on farm near Aliwal North; the two ANC men were the last two of the group involved in the bomb incident 
at East London on 6 August, and the Butterworth and Elliot shootings on 7 August" (TRC 1994: 74). 
There is some confusion about the number of guerrillas involved in these incidents and their fate: the Commission dug 
up the remains of four guerrillas secretly buried by police on an Aliwal North farm after this incident, thus accounting for 
the two killed on 7 August and the two killed on 13 August. They were Mr. Anthony Sureboy Dali, Mr. Thabo Makhubo, 
Mr. Joseph Lesetja Sexwale and one 'Senzangakhona' (Goodwin and Schiff 1995: 43-56). However, it is not clear what 
happened to the guerrilla reported as having been arrested on 7 August: was he one of the two shot dead five days later? 
He may have been MK member Gwaza Twalo, whose family told the Commission he disappeared from the Pretoria 
prison following a clash with police in the Aliwal North/Herschel area some time after 1980; another witness told the 
Commission that the SAP had told the International Committee of the Red Cross that Twalo had been detained in Aliwal 
North and released in May 1980 without charges (surprising considering that he had fled the country together with the 
Azanian People’s Liberation Army’s (APLA) Sabelo Phama and had undergone ANC training in Angola). Depending on the 
date of disappearance, Twalo may have been the guerrilla arrested on 7 August; alternatively he may have been arrested 
in an earlier incident and killed in a similar way to the latter four (Goodwin and Schiff 1995: 43-56).
By late 1981, the Vlakplaas unit had been sent down to the Eastern Cape for a stint of several weeks, as reported by 
Dirk Coetzee. He reports that the C1 unit moved down to the Eastern Cape following a clash between police and 
guerrillas at Elliot and Barkly Pass in August 1981 (presumably the clash which resulted in the guerrillas being buried on 
the Aliwal North farm) and worked there for seven to eight weeks. The early killings related to the fuel depot blasts 
described above may have involved the askaris who were permanently based at Vlakplaas; the Ndondo killing in 1985 
seems to have been orchestrated from there (Goodwin and Schiff 1995: 43-56). By the time Ngono was abducted the 
Ladybrand police were involved. By the time of the Sangoni, Mayaphi and Mgibe killings in February 1988, the askari unit 
was operating out of East London. 1987 and 1988 seem to have been the key years for the killing of guerrillas, primarily 
by locally based police.
There were various incidents of guerrillas dying in clashes during 1985-86; it is not clear how many of these were 
deliberately orchestrated by the security forces and how many were isolated incidents. They include: six PAC members 
killed in a clash with Lesotho security forces at Qacha’s Nek near the Lesotho/Transkei border (one of the six was Mr. 
Thami Zani from King William's Town, a friend of Steve Biko); Mr. Zolani Mvula, who died during an explosion in a car 
while travelling between Engcobo and Umtata together with brothers Mlungisi and Bongani Booi; the death of an 
unknown guerrilla in Sterkspruit on 13 April 1986 following two clashes with police; in May 1986 an unnamed guerrilla 
was reported by the press to have been shot dead at a roadblock in Transkei; in July 1986 there was a clash between 
police and guerrillas at Mount Fletcher (Johns and Davis 1991: 133).
Transkei and [sentence?] an explosives cache were found; also in July 1986 former SAAWU member turned ANC 
guerrilla Mathemba Vuso was shot dead by Ciskei police in Mdantsane. In December 1986 alleged guerrilla Ngwenduna 
Vanda was shot dead by Transkei police constables Ishmael Commando Dzai and Nelson Nceba Solombela while crossing 
from Lesotho in Transkei near Telle Bridge border post; an inquest later found they did not have the right to shoot him, 
but no prosecution ensued. In July 1987, another former SAAWU unionist, Mr. Eric Mntonga, died in detention at the 
hands of the Ciskei police. In March or April 1987 General Johan Coetzee moved into the region. The official reason for 
bringing the general out of retirement was to co-ordinate a tri-partite commission involving South Africa (Manganyi 1990: 
68-79), Transkei and Ciskei, to keep peace between the two warring bantustans. Ironically, the immediate need for the 
commission had been sparked by the failed TDF attack on Ciskei president Lennox Sebe’s palace in January 1987; this 
was later revealed to have been planned by the SADF as part of Operation Katzen.
At the same time, national politicians publicly warned of the possibility of illegal security force actions against guerrillas. 
On 28 March 1987, then minister of defence Magnus Malan warned that the South African security forces would "sniff 
out" any ANC guerrillas in neighbouring states and wipe them out. Ten days later on 8 April, then minister of foreign 
affairs Pik Botha claimed ANC "terrorists" were planning to disrupt the upcoming elections and warned neighbouring 
states that South Africa would take "whatever action" necessary to stop them (Price 1991:74). It was during March and 
April that Maqekeza was killed in Lesotho, and Dubeni and Mfeti were killed in South Africa. Not much is known about 
Coetzee’s tri-partite commission; its role was still unclear by the time it closed down two years later. It held very few 
meetings, Coetzee was unwilling to be interviewed by journalists and no public report was ever issued by it.
About four months after it was set up, the Commission announced its first meeting. This meeting established a 
security agreement signed by SA, Ciskei and Transkei in Cape Town on April 10 by PW Botha, Lennox Sebe and George 
Matanzima. After the meeting, Coetzee said the group was likely to meet again soon and regularly. A statement issued by 
the director of co-operation between the TBVC states and South Africa at the Bureau for Information, Mr. CM van 
Niekerk, said that the functions of the commission would be "to promote good neighbourliness, peace, security, justice 
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and economic progress in the Eastern Cape region by investigating, monitoring and making recommendations to the two 
governments about all matters which may adversely affect relations between the three states" (Price 1991:77). In 
October, Coetzee told the Eastern Province Herald that he could not discuss the commission’s work unless the other 
two members, Ciskei director general of manpower MC Kashe and Transkei's chief of civil defence General JS Mantutle, 
were present.
During the period of the commission’s existence, Coetzee was consistently unavailable for interviews, and at one 
point both bantustan governments said that they did not really know what the commission was doing. There was 
frequent tension between Transkei and Ciskei during this time, but the three-person commission rarely met. In January 
1989, during yet another spat between the two bantustans, Ciskei spokesman Headman Somtunzi said he did not think 
the commission existed anymore, while South African Foreign Affairs spokesman Roland Darrell said that he thought it 
still existed but he "was not aware of anything that it’s done recently". Darrell later said it was "overshadowed" by other 
initiatives, but confirmed that Coetzee was still involved (Greenstein 1994: 641-61). Other South African officials were 
reluctant to comment or gave confusing replies. By April 1989, the mysterious commission had closed down, although 
this was only reported in January the following year; a Department of Foreign Affairs spokesman said at the time that the 
closure had been reported to a local newspaper, but the newspaper could find no record of this. When asked to 
comment on the possibility that the commission had been an excuse for Coetzee to be in the region to run security 
operations, Mr. Mark Phillips of the Wits University Centre for Policy Studies said that Coetzee was a proponent of the 
view that targeting and removing key activists was a better way of dealing with opposition than the state of emergency.
A complication for these covert police operations was the coup in Transkei by Major General Bantu Holomisa, who 
took over briefly first in September 1987 and then permanently in December 1987. During 1988 the SAP and their 
askaris were still operating in Umtata, but apparently without the support of the military government, which seems to 
have been a little confused over how to stop them; by early 1988 there were rumours in Umtata of a clandestine SAP 
base operating from a house near the Umtata golf course (Greenstein 1994: 641-61). It seems that part of the need for 
the clandestine co-operation between SAP and TPF was not just in order to keep it out of the public eye, but more 
importantly to keep it out of Holomisa’s eye.
Illegal handovers went hand in hand with the crackdown on guerrillas; during 1988-89 this appears to have been a 
source of some conflict between the then ruling TDF and the more conservative TPF. In 1987 ANC guerrilla Livingstone 
Matutu was arrested in Bophuthatswana, handed over to South African security police and then illegally handed over to 
Transkei authorities. During 1988, he appeared on trial in Transkei, in a case that his lawyers claimed the authorities tried 
to keep from their knowledge (Greenstein 1994: 641-62). In December 1988, Transkei commissioner of police General 
Leonard Kawe said that Transkei and South African forces needed to co-operate in order to carry out their work. Kawe 
was speaking in response to criticism from South African judge PB Hodes, who criticised the South African police for 
knowingly and illegally allowing the Transkei police to cross the border to deliver a suspect. By the end of 1988, the 
Transkei police seemed to be increasing their power in the bantustan, with the military rulers apparently unable to curb 
them (Lave 1994: 483-524). By early 1990 the military government felt confident enough to take on its own police force 
in public: Holomisa warned his police that any activities involving their co-operation with the SAP had to be cleared with 
their seniors first. Holomisa said that earlier in the week members of the SAP had searched vehicles "deep inside Transkei 
territory" and that the SA embassy in Umtata had said this was done with the co-operation of a Transkei police officer, but 
that this had still to be verified.
During this period, the police also tried to recruit askaris among guerrillas who had survived to be jailed. Mr Stembele 
Zokwe (see below) was probably one of these; he was later shot dead in 1988 (Lave 1994: 483-524). During 1989, East 
London security policeman Captain Charles van Wyk told a Transkei court he had tried to recruit accused Phumzile 
Mayaphi (later sentenced to death for the Wild Coast Sun bombing) as a police spy. One strategy used by the SAP to 
protect their members from prosecution relating to illegal killings was that of changing their names. When Transkei's 
Attorney-General tried to charge the police in connection with the Ndondo killing of September 1987, he was told by the 
SAP that SAP member Mbuso Enoch Shabalala was dead; it later emerged that he was very much alive and had officially 
changed his name (SAIRRs 1994: 97). Mr Bongani Wana, implicated first in the Sangoni et al. killings of February 1988 and 
later along with SADF MI in the abortive Duli coup attempt of November 1990, is now known as Charles Wanase; his 
new identity document was issued in July 1991 and he was serving as a member of the SANDF after the elections. 
Mr. Pumelele Gumengu, a sergeant in the Transkei security police, was arrested on charges of killing MK guerrilla 
Stembele Zokwe in Butterworth shortly after his arrest on 12 January 1988. Gumengu, who escaped from custody on the 
same day as his co-accused, Sergeant Aaron Tyani, although they were held in different prisons, was later arrested by the 
Transkei government in connection with the abortive November 1990 coup attempt led by Colonel Craig Duli and 
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supported by SADF MI. Gumengu was arrested carrying a passport in the name of Zama Dube: his lawyer told the 
Umtata Supreme Court that this was in fact Gumengu’s real name (HRW/A 1994: 78).
Sergeant Tyani, who escaped custody while facing charges in connection with the January 1988 Zokwe murder, is also 
understood to have changed his name. In a similar strategy, Vulindlela Mbotoli gained South African citizenship (as 
opposed to Transkei citizenship) in mid-1991 in an attempt to avoid extradition to Transkei on charges relating to the Duli 
coup attempt (Ottaway 1993: 121). He was ultimately abducted by the TDF MI from Johannesburg, put on trial and 
jailed. Similarly in KwaZulu, former KZP special constable Vela Mchunu was issued with a KZP appointment certificate in 
the name of Alfred Masango in March 1991 to help him evade prosecution (see KwaZulu section below).
There were some revenge attacks on the police, clearly carried out by MK members. In 1990 Madliwa, the co-
ordinator of the askari unit in East London and the man in charge of the February 1988 attack on Sangoni et al., was 
gunned down outside Mdantsane’s Cecilia Makiwane Hospital. In February 1994, Ms. Xolelwa Vusani (31, aka Noxolo or 
Dudu or Fetsha), was shot dead in Mdantsane; her baby who she was holding at the time was injured in the shooting 
(Greenstein 1994: 641-61). Vusani had been involved in the September 1985 killing of Ndondo in Cala. Clashes between 
police and guerrillas, which guerrillas frequently did not survive, continued during 1988, especially in Transkei. Transkei 
police, sometimes working together with the SAP, were involved in these incidents.
Two guerrillas who were eventually charged in a court were Mr. Ndibulele Ndzamela and Mr. Phumzile Mayaphi, who 
were sentenced to death for bombing the Wild Coast Sun on 18 April 1986 (both were eventually freed after the 1990 
unbannings and later implicated in the hit squad killing of an ANC dissident in Transkei). While they were on trial during 
February 1988, Mayaphi's brother Zonwabele stopped in at the Umtata Supreme Court to attend the trial. After he left 
the court buildings with his friends Zolile Sangoni, Thozamile Nkume and MK member Thembisile "Gift" Mgibe, they 
were followed by a police hit squad, pulled over and gunned down; only Nkume, who seemed to have coincidentally 
hitched a lift with the group, survived (Greenstein 1994: 641-61). The killers were SAP member Sergeant Mpumelelo 
Madliwa from East London, TPF member Constable Bongani Wana from Umtata and three askaris; they later told an 
inquest they had been armed with irregular weapons, used false vehicle registration numbers and had fired because they 
thought the guerrilla was going to attack them (HRW/A 1994: 75). They justified the killing to the inquest by explaining 
that Mgibe was a guerrilla; Mayaphi and Sangoni appear to have been targeted because of their connections to the 
terrorism trial and a prominent firm of human rights lawyers respectively.
In January 1988, clashes between police and guerrillas continued in Transkei with few guerrillas surviving. On 25 
January, there was a shoot-out near Ugie; the following day two guerrillas (Mr. Siphiwo Hamlet Mazwai and one "Bobo") 
died in a clash with police while four others were detained (Horrell 1978: 55). Mazwai’s family later claimed that police 
had not even informed them of Siphiwo’s death. Both the SAP and SADF monitored his Grahamstown funeral and the 
area was declared an operational zone for the duration. On 8 March 1988, MK member Qondo Hoho and his uncle 
Acacia Hoho were killed and six policemen injured in a shootout after the SAP surrounded a house in Mlungisi near 
Queenstown. The house was afterwards bulldozed by police, a technique often used by police when dealing with 
guerrillas. On 2 July 88, a clash between police and guerrillas in Mzamba, Transkei, resulted in one guerrilla being captured 
and another two escaping (Horrell 1978: 57). About a week later, in an incident probably linked to this, another clash 
followed; guerrilla Leo Mkuseli Xatula was killed. Evidence had it that Xatula was detained, held for some days and then 
executed. On 28 September 1988, MK member Lungisa Christian Qokweni died after a shoot-out with Ciskei police at a 
house in NU5 in Mdantsane. Ciskei denied that the SAP had also been involved in the shoot-out.
In October 1988, Transkei and South African police working together arrested guerrilla Aga Khan Tiya in Umtata. An 
arms cache was reportedly found at the same time. Two weeks after the arrest, Tiya appeared in the intensive care ward 
of the Umtata hospital, his throat having been cut while in custody (Lave 1994: 483-524). He was released and 
subsequently died under unexplained circumstances, presumably having been assassinated. On 25 December 1988 in 
Mdantsane, Ciskei, an unknown gunman attacked civil rights lawyer Hintsa Siwisa, unionists Jeff Wabena and Billy Shiyani 
and their friends Noluthando Ntongana, Norie Joli and Virginia Panziso, leaving Joli and Panziso dead (Greenstein 1994: 
641-61). Later rumours were that this was part of an internal ANC clash between opposing youth movements and that 
embezzlement of union funds may have been involved; however there is a strong possibility that this may also have been 
the work of the covert police unit. 
While the coup attempt by Charles Sebe in Ciskei was probably at least supported by the SADF and the 1987 attack 
on Lennox Sebe was part of the SADF’s Operation Katzen, there were a few rumblings which appear to have been 
independent actions. In January 1987, Bantu Holomisa was in detention in a Transkei jail, apparently partly for opposing 
Transkei involvement in Operation Katzen and partly for refusing to send in the TDF against an MK guerrilla involved in a 
shootout at Willowvale. A few months later he was out of detention, the former Selous Scouts were on the road out of 
Transkei and Holomisa was head of the TDF (SACS 1995: 39-47). At this point, the SADF appeared to have lost control 
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over the TDF. In September, Holomisa took over the Transkei government; shortly afterwards he handed over to the 
civilian government of Stella Sigcau. On 31 December 1987 Holomisa deposed Sigcau’s government, citing corruption, 
and took control to run Transkei until the 1994 elections.
During his first coup, Holomisa waited until Prime Minister George Matanzima was "out of the country" in Port 
Elizabeth; President Tutor Ndamase was allowed to continue undisturbed and later appeared on publicity posters 
alongside military council members (SACS 1995: 59-64). A legal challenge to Holomisa’s government brought later by 
former president Kaiser Matanzima was subsequently overturned when the Transkei Supreme Court ruled that 
Holomisa’s government was the de facto Transkei government. The Holomisa coups had a crucial effect on the security 
forces’ policy on the Eastern Cape: when the South African security forces finally realised that Holomisa would tolerate 
opposition and, after the 1990 unbannings, allow the liberation movements to organise freely, they changed tactics from 
prioritising attacking those regarded as members of liberation movements to attacking the Transkei government instead. 
Thus by the 1990s a spate of coup attempts were launched by the South African security forces to try to unseat 
Holomisa; to no avail.
Conclusion
It could thus be concluded that the suppression of political opposition in the erstwhile Ciskei and Transkei Bantustans 
during the era in question was unprecedented. The Pondoland Revolt was marked by numerous incidents of violence, a 
state of emergency, widespread detentions, criminal prosecutions and banishment of families. The use of vigilantes in 
Ciskei fostered inter-bantustan conflict through Operation Katzen in what was part of a national bantustans military 
strategy. Vigilantes operating under the supervision of police were brought in to man roadblocks, assault commuters,
break boycotts by assaulting commuters in taxis, on trains and in private cars. The Ciskei policy to subdue dissent entailed 
brutalisation of communities. Operation Katzen, used as a bulwark against the rising tide of popular resistance, left untold 
stories of violating civil liberties in these bantustans. The security forces countered the revolutionary onslaught in the 
most brutal manner. The abductions of freedom fighters led to various incidents of deaths at the hands of the security 
forces. The violation of civil liberties in Ciskei and Transkei was such that by the end of the 1980s these bantustan armies 
embarked on insurrection.
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